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C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003527

SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [START](#) [RS](#)
SUBJECT: MFA PREVIEWS POST-START ISSUES FOR DECEMBER 15
MEETING

REF: A. STATE 114461
[1](#)B. STATE 117164
[1](#)C. MOSCOW 3153

Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells for reasons
1.4(b) and (d)

[1](#)1. (C) Vladimir Yermakov, head of the START Treaty section in the MFA Office of Security and Disarmament Affairs (DVBR), told us December 3 that the GOR was looking forward to a "frank discussion" of all the issues related to a post-START Treaty agreement at the December 15 meeting between the delegations led by Acting U/S Rood and DFM Ryabkov. The GOR was continuing to study the text we provided October 24 (refs A, B, C) and hoped to have a non-paper in response in time for the December 15 meeting. Yermakov said the GOR had been "surprised" that the USG text had not included the language Russia had proposed almost a year ago to A/S DeSutter, even in brackets. Therefore, Moscow was also working on an alternative text, but it was unlikely to be ready until mid-January.

[1](#)2. (C) Yermakov said the three key issues for the GOR were:
-- Reduction in the number of warheads (with "any number between zero and 2200 open for discussion");
-- inclusion of delivery vehicles; and,
-- all strategic weapons stockpiles to be kept on national territory.
When asked about the numbers of stockpiled weapons, Yermakov said the GOR did not really care what was kept in storage. Emphasizing that the GOR did not understand the definition of "operationally deployed warheads," as proposed by the U.S., Yermakov added that as long as there was a limit on all strategic delivery vehicles and they were counted, the GOR had no problem with the number of warheads placed on such vehicles. The GOR envisioned that the number would be presumed to be the maximum that could be carried by each type of delivery vehicle.

[1](#)3. (C) Yermakov reiterated that Russia did not want as cumbersome and complicated verification and inspection provisions as in the START Treaty, and said Moscow was looking at the structure of the text we had provided. He thought the approach, with a very short Treaty text, followed by a Protocol with the detailed provisions, might work, provided all parts were legally binding and had the same character as the Treaty itself.
BEYRLE